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JPRS L/8268

6 February 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON VIETNAM
(FOUO 2/79)

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS

The following information on Vietnamese military units was extracted from Vietnamese press sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Unit designators and subordination are as they appear in the original source. The remarks include a brief summary of the salient information available in the news items.

[Note: Subordination of navy fleet elements, in descending order, based on articles in the press, is as follows: Ham Doi (Fleet), Hai Doan (Group), Hai Doi (Flotilla), Bien Doi (Border Unit)]

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
*Bach Dang Fleet	Activated in 1975
-Chuong Duong Gp	-Completed training program
Vessel HQKM	
Vessel 97	
-Van Kiep GP	-Made urgent delivery of supplies
Vessel 04	to islands including the Bao To
	Archipelago
-Ham Tu Gp	-Combat readiness activities in south
2nd Border Unit, 11th	
Flotilla	
Vessel 64	
-1st Border Unit	-Sank 9 Cambodian vessels
	(NHAN DAN 14 Dec 78 p 3)
Vam Co Regt, 9th MR	Activated following beginning of border
	war with Cambodia. Training of new
	troops described. (NHAN DAN 14 Dec 78 p 3)
Border Defense Post 749	Located in Thanh Long area, Chau Thanh
	District, Tay Ninh Province. (NHAN DAN
	14 Dec 78 p 3)

*Full translation of cited article will be published.

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6th Anti Aircraft Artillery Gp, "X" MR	Photos show unit personnel working on guns and ammunition. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 11 Dec 78 p 1)
33rd Gp	Cleared 5,500 hectares for cultivation in 1978 in the Krong Pach area, Dac Lac Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 11 Dec 78 p 2)
Sao Vang Gp, 1st MR	Commander: Nguyen T....Unit tactical elements fired individual and crew served weapons. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 1)
T53 Transportation Gp, 3rd MR 2nd Bn 3rd Bn -39th Bn	Exceeded transportation goals. -Operated barges on flood relief work in the 4th MR (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 1)
30th Air Force Gp	Photo shows unit executive officer at controls of aircraft. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 1)
Bach Dang Fleet	Constructed recreational facilities for subordinate elements on a number of islands. (VAN NGHE QUAN DOI Nov 78 p 144)
2nd Regt, Cuu Long Corps	Unit members are avid readers, even in foxholes. (VAN NGHE QUAN DOI Nov 78 p 144)
Soc Son Gp, Central Vietnam Air Defense Forces	Cultural activities noted. (VAN NGHE QUAN DOI Nov 78 p 144)
Post 96, Peoples Armed Public Security Force	Located at Cua lo - Cua Hoi, Nghe Tinh Province. (THANH NIEN Oct 78 p 56)
87th Gp, Ha Bac Province	Account of billeting troops on local populace. Recently converted from a rehabilitation unit to a recruit training unit. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 78 pp 48-56)
No Unit	Photo of Senior General Văn Tiên Dũng, Major General Đặng Kính, Deputy Chief of Staff, VPA, the 5th MR Commander [?]-a Major General-and three Senior Colonels of the 5th MR. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 1)

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15th Gp	Located in the M'Drac area of Dac Lac Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 2)
73rd Gp	On 1 Oct 78 engaged the 221st Cambodian Division. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 12 Dec 78 p 3)
311th Flotilla, 3rd Navy District [Vung Duyen Hai] Vessel 706	Photo shows crew members manning anti-aircraft. (HANOI MOI 21 Nov 78 p 4)
84th Gp	60% of unit members are from Hoan Kiem Ward and Dong Anh District, Hanoi. Doing economic construction work in north western Vietnam. (HANOI MOI 24 Nov 78 p 2)
33rd Bn, 14th Regt, 559th Command	Account given of unit member who died in combat in 1967. (PHU NU VIETNAM 29 Nov-5 Dec 78 p 2)
Song Da Missile Gp	Photo shows missiles on mount. (NHAN DAN 16 Dec 78 p 1)
144th Gp, General Staff	Satisfactorily completed 1978 training program. (NHAN DAN 17 Dec 78 p 1)
Song Thao Engineer Gp	Satisfactorily completed 1978 training program. (NHAN DAN 17 Dec 78 p 1)
37th Flotilla, V-1 Gp	Photo of anti aircraft guns on vessel. (NHAN DAN 21 Dec 78 p 3)
2nd Infantry Gp, Tay Nguyen Corps	Reconnaissance team defends border against enemy incursion. (NHAN DAN 22 Dec 78 p 3)
01 Gp, Armored Forces	Training in preparation for combat. (NHAN DAN 22 Dec 78 p 3)
2nd Navy Gp	Defending southwestern maritime boundary. (NHAN DAN 22 Dec 78 p 3)
13th Gp	Located in the Bay Nui area of An Giang Province in Oct 78. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 18 Nov 78 p 1)
No Unit	Photo of radar installation at An Hai, Haiphong. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 18 Nov 78 p 3)

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205th Signal Regt 5th Bn 77th Bn	Routine signal activities noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Nov 78 p 1)
Quan Tien Phong Div	Training, self support farming reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Nov 78 p 1)
5th Engineer Regt	Road construction on Highway 6. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Nov 78 p 1)
33rd Truck Transportation Regt 51st Bn 53rd Bn	Commended for economizing gasoline. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Nov 78 p 3)
4th Artillery Regt, "N" Div	Assisted in flood relief work. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Nov 78 p 1)
N71 Truck Transportation Gp 964th Bn	Provided flood relief assistance to people of Nghe Tinh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Nov 78 p 1)
Song Lo Engineer Gp	Assisted typhoon victims in a new economic zone located at Thanh Khe, Thanh Chuong District, Nghe Tinh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Nov 78 p 1)
31st Gp Unit 701 Unit 702 Unit 704 Unit 705	Economic construction in the Central Highlands. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Nov 78 p 1)
63rd Gp, Haiphong Air Defense Forces	Recently organized an historical display. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 16 Dec 78 p 1)
6th Bn, 99th Engineer Gp	Provided instructions in the construction of 35-50 ton capacity bridges. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 18 Dec 78 p 1)
Tay Son Infantry Gp, 1st MR	Assigned to a border location. Self support farming and food gathering reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 18 Dec 78 p 3)
26th Signal Bn	Self support farming noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN 18 Dec 78 p 3)
86th Gp, Chemical Warfare Forces	" " " "

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-	Air Force	Propagandization activities in subordinate
-	Bau Giang Gp	units reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
-	Thang Long Gp	19 Dec 78 p 1)
-	3370th Gp	
-	Cuu Long Gp	
-	Ba Vi Gp	
-	Dong Nai Gp	
-	Lam Son Gp	
-	Sao Do Gp	
-	Song Cam Gp	
-	7th MR	Propagandization activities in subordinate
-	2nd Gp	units reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
-	3rd Gp	20 Dec 78 p 1)
-	5th Gp	
-	74th Gp	
-	02nd Gp	
-	"H" Antiaircraft Artillery Gp,	Achieved good training results under
-	1st MR	adverse condition. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
-	14th Bn	20 Dec 78 p 1)
-	5th Gp, 7th MR	Combat achievements of unit member against
-		Cambodians in Tay Ninh Province reported.
-		(QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Dec 78 p 2)
-	10th Gp	Self support farming. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
-		20 Dec 78 p 3)
-	86th Gp, Chemical Warfare Forces	" " " "
-	X 09 Gp	" " " "
-	Dung Manh Gp	In combat against Cambodians on the Gia
-		Lai - Kon Tum Border. (QUAN DOI NHAN
-		DAN 21 Dec 78 p 1)
-	Hanoi Air Defense Forces	Propagandization activities noted.
-	76th Gp	(QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Dec 78 p 1)
-	12th Gp	
-	Hong Linh Gp	
-	Tam Diep Gp	
-	Song Da Gp	
-	21st Armored Bn, 7th MR	In combat with Cambodians. (QUAN DOI
-		NHAN DAN 21 Dec 78 p 1)

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3rd Bn, 4th Gp, 3rd MR

Commander: Captain Nguyễn Đình Hồng.
Article discusses arrival of replacements
from Hanoi. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
21 Dec 78 p 2)

6th Gp

Deputy Political Officer: Hà Văn Toàn.
Working on Highway 14. (QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN 21 Dec 78 p 2)

No Unit

Photo of F5 fighter planes being armed
and fueled. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
21 Dec 78 p 3)

9th MR

Unit Improvement measures result in better
combat performance. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
22 Dec 78 p 1)

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
10th Gp	A Ho Chi Minh City unit. Making preparations for an upcoming military review. (Ho Chi Minh City TIN SANG 24 Nov 78 p 7)
4th Quyet Thang Regt	" " " "
10th Co, Song Dao [Anti Aircraft] Gp	Located near the northern border. (NHAN DAN 26 Dec 78 p 3)
68th Gp	Afforestation work in Luc Ngan District, Ha Bac Province. (NHAN DAN 26 Dec 78 p 3)
2nd Gp	Political Officer: Trần Hữu. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 26 Dec 78 p 3)
Dong Thap Air Force Gp	Good results in technical training reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78 p 1)
20th Gp	Located in an area through which Cambodian refugees entered Vietnam. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78 p 2)
12th Gp	Unit training reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78 p 3)
Sao Vang Gp	Photo of men practicing marksmanship. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78 p 3)

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N6 Engineer Gp	Constructed athletic field. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78, p 3)
40th Brigade	Unit members commended for discipline. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 78 p 3)
Lam Son Air Force Gp	Pilot commended for exceeding flying requirements. (NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Navy H6 Brigade B7 Regt	Provided training for local boat forces. (NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
7th Gp, Hanoi Forces	Completed 1978 training in November. (NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
205th Gp, Commo-Liaison Forces	Increased communications service reported. (NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
10th Gp, Katum Forces	Unit sniper guns down Cambodians. (NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Quyet Thang Corps Quan Tien Phong Div Dong Bang Div Chien Thang Div	Recently conducted extended field mobile operations. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 1)
"B" Sapper Gp 1st Bn 35th Bn	High morale and good training noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Nguyen Trai Artillery Gp, 3rd MR 22nd Bn	Commended for high level of training. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
39th Engineer Gp	Photo of unit member and bridge laying trucks. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Song Thao Gp	Political Officer: V.D.K. Successfully completed bridge building exercise. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Song Lo Gp	Political Officer: T.Q.T. Provided assistance in flood relief work in Nghe Tinh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Song Da Gp	Road construction work reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)

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420 Gp	Deputy Political Officer: L.T. Worked on the Hanoi Airport. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
N30 Gp	Recently completed a project 10 days ahead of schedule. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
Bac Son Gp	Completed work on a difficult project. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 28 Dec 78 p 3)
66th Gp, Huong Giang Corps	Marksmanship training reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 29 Dec 78 p 1)
14th Co, 9th Signal Gp	Photo of unit members laying wire. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 29 Dec 78 p 1)
Thanh Long Bridge Enterprise Self Defense Regt	Activated on 25 Nov 78. (HANOI MOI 26 Nov 78 p 1)
311th Flotilla, 3rd Navy Dist Vessel 206	Photo of crew members at battle stations (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 1)
4th MR 8th Signal Gp 14th Engineer Gp	Flood relief work by subordinate units in Chin Nan area [Nan Dan District?], Nghe Tinh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 1)
26th Signal Bn, Rear Service General Department	Women unit members score on rifle range. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 1)
Gia Dinh Gp	Recently destroyed elements of the Cambodian 156th Regt. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 3)
2nd Armored Brigade	Satisfactory results of marksmanship training reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 1)
Binh Tri Thien Province Local Forces 85th Gp 86th Gp 87th Gp Phu Xuan Gp 14th Bn	Provided flood relief assistance in Le Ninh, Huong Dien, Bo Trach, Huong Phu and Ben Hai Districts. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 4)
People's Armed Public Security Forces 9th Gp Unit 44 Unit 48	Assisted local populace in harvesting crops. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Dec 78 p 4)

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Ham Rong Anti Aircraft Artillery Gp	State of training reported good. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 14 Dec 78 p 4)
33rd Gp	Located on Highway 21A from southeast of Buon Me Thuot to the foot of Phuong Huong Passes. Self support farming reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 14 Dec 78 p 2)
6th Co, 2nd Bn, X74th Mechanized Gp, 5th MR	Photos show that unit is equipped with M.113 armored personnel carriers. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Dec 78 p 1)
823rd Border Defense Post, People's Armed Public Security Forces	Located in An Giang Province. Probably near Luong Phi Village, Bay Nui District. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Dec 78 p 2)
Phu Dong Gp	Unit member writes poem on his unit's kite shaped antennas. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Dec 78 p 3)
74th Gp, POL Department	Unit garners satisfactory results from self support farming. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Dec 78 p 3)
109th Military Hospital	Vegetable farming results noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Dec 78 p 3)
41st Regt, Sao Vang Gp	Political Officer: Lê Văn. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 1 Jan 79 p 3)
Sao Vang Gp	Assisted local populace along border. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Jan 79 p 1)
3rd Infantry Gp, 1st MR	Received Presidential Citation for accomplishments in 1978. (NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 1)
Moc Chau Infantry Gp, Tay Bac	" " " "
31st Regt, 9th Gp, 5th MR	" " " "
174th Regt, 5th Gp, 7th MR	" " " "
18th Regt, 8th Gp, 9th MR	" " " "
10th Regt, Tay Nguyen Corps	" " " "
Song Lam Gp, Cuu Long Corps	" " " "
935th Regt, 72nd Gp, Air Force	" " " "

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28th Navy Gp	" " " "
33rd Regt, Transportation Department, Rear Services General Department	" " " "
600th Gp, Construction Depart- ment, Economic Construction General Department	" " " "
525th Truck Transportation Regt	Unit member commended for conserving gasoline. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 1)
13th Commo-Liaison Station, Binh Tram 8, Transportation Department	Self support farming accomplishments noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 1)
Trung Dung Infantry Gp	Good results in tactical training and marksmanship reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 2)
Pharmaceuticals Enterprise No 2, Medical Department	Exceeded 1978 goals. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 2)
Factory X10, Signal Command	Production and repair achievements noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 2)
National Defense Factory 59, Technical General Department	Many production teams completed 1978 plan ahead of schedule. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 2)
39th Engineer Gp	Commander: "T"; Political Officer: "K"; Deputy Commander: "P". (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 3)
103rd Military Hospital	Inspecting medicines prior to use. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Jan 79 p 3)
Hong Linh Anti Aircraft Artillery Gp	Provided rice for flood victims of Nghe Tinh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)
Binh Long Gp Thao Nguyen Gp 7th Bn 8th Bn	Satisfactory marksmanship results reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)
Lam Son [Signal] Gp	Repaired wire line, restored 150 kilometers of pole line. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)

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Nam Lien [Signal] Gp	Installed a new, 400 kilometer line. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)
Vien Thong Signal Gp	Good communications noted. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)
130th Gp	Handled high volume of hardcopy traffic. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 1)
35th Gp, Economic Construction General Department	Political Officer: Cù Văn Mí. Unit doing road construction work. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 3)
79th Navy Gp	Unit member scores well in military athletics. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 3)
Song Thao Engineer Gp	Photo shows unit constructing temporary bridge. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 4 Jan 79 p 3)
2nd Gp	Recently surrounded an invading Cambodian force in the Ta Hec zone of Chau Thanh District, Tay Ninh Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 1)
32nd Gp, 7th MR	Land clearance and manioc planting reported. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 1)
8th Gp, 7th MR	Defending southwest border. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 1)
Factory 276, Technical General Department	Drying manioc. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 1)
Factory 219, Technical General Department	Recently filled urgent combat supply need. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 1)
Song Thao Engineer Gp	Self support farming. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 2)
3rd Bn, 9th Signal Gp	Preparing to begin technical training. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 3)
Ready-to-wear Garment Factory 20	Political Officer and Director: Lieutenant Colonel Ngô Mân. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Jan 79 p 3)

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PETYA CLASS ESCORT VESSELS TRANSFERRED FROM USSR TO SRV

Tokyo YOMIURI SHINBUN in Japanese 14 Dec 78 p 1 (Eve)

[Text] On 14 December the government source made the following disclosure: "It would appear that during the early part of December, two Petya class (approximately 1000 tons) escort vessels belonging to the USSR Pacific Fleet have been transferred to Vietnam (SRV) which has just signed a treaty of amity and cooperation with the Soviet Union." This observation is based on the Defense Agency's detailed analysis and the transfer is a certainty. The Soviet Union and SRV are rapidly drawing closer to each other after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship between China and Japan. The transfer of the two escort vessels is the first indication of a move by USSR and SRV to strengthen military cooperation--especially their naval ties--following the conclusion of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between the two countries. The Defense Agency speculates that the offer of Soviet warships to SRV will not be limited to mere transfer of warships but will mean aid toward the construction of a (naval) base facility to maintain warships.

Transfer Will Affect SRV's Anti-China Struggle

As a result, the Defense Agency holds that the SRV naval base will undoubtedly be used as a transit facility between Vladivostok and the Indian Ocean that the USSR's Pacific Fleet has been wanting so desperately. It intends to keep a close watch on future developments. According to the Defense Agency, during the afternoon of 23 November the two Petya class escort vessels believed to have been transferred to SRV were seen due west of Itsushima Archipelago, Nagasaki Prefecture being towed southward at the rate of 1 kilometer per hour. Later, the two tugboats, "Staroyechernoye [phonetic]" (500 ton) and Varus [phonetic]" (2,700 ton)--both lone ships--were sighted sailing northward by a Maritime Self-Defense vessel. Varus was seen in the Tsushima Strait during the evening of 10 December and Staroyechernoye, during the evening of 13 December.

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Having assayed the data by means of aerial photography and other methods, the Defense Agency determined that: (1) the two escort vessels traveling southward did not have crew on board; (2) they were freshly painted; (3) only the tugboats made the return trip and judging from the observed speed on both occasions, the destination had to have been 3500 kilometers from Tsushima Strait--in other words, Vietnam--as the vessels did not go into the Indian Ocean. For these reasons, the Defense Agency judged that the two Petya class escort vessels were handed over to SRV.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation between USSR and SRV includes a clause calling for "consultation in case of emergency" (Article 6). Moreover, it espouses to strengthen friendly ties, solidify political relations and deepen cooperation in all sectors--that is to say, the said treaty anticipates possible military cooperation between the two countries.

As the border dispute between China (PRC) and SRV intensifies, there have been repeated maritime skirmishes in the neighboring seas between Chinese and Vietnamese ships. Three coastguard vessels and two high speed patrol boats are the mainstay of the Vietnamese Navy and SRV Navy is capable of coastal policing functions only. The Defense Agency speculates, however, that the addition of two Petya class escort ships will greatly enhance the SRV's position in the territorial dispute.

The [Japanese] government stated that it would like to closely observe the pace of Soviet military aid to the SRV in the future. Some American experts claim that the construction of refueling station for the USSR Navy is steadily advancing in the Camran Bay. Therefore the Japanese government plans to seek further data while working in close contact with the United States.

(Notes) Petya Class Escort Vessel

displacement volume: 950 - 1150 tons
total length: 82 meters
width: 9.1 meters
two 76 millimeter artilleries (double barreled)
four anti-submarine rockets (16 rounds)
one 16 inch torpedo launching tube (5 rounds)
speed: 30 knots per hour



Soviet manufactured Petya class escort vessel believed to have been transferred to the SRV--photograph provided by the Defense Agency.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

USSR INDOCHINA STRATEGY ANALYZED

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU [JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW] in Japanese Vol 14 No 1 (No 154)
Jan 79 pp 34-43

[Article by Takio Yamazaki, international affairs researcher: "Commentary on Soviet Indochina Strategy"]

[Text] With the conclusion of the Indochina war which covered thirty years after World War II, it was expected that a period of peace would settle in, without any wars in Southeast Asia, and that peaceful coexistence would come about among the three socialist countries of Indochina and the liberal countries of ASEAN (Alliance of Southeast Asian Nations).

In reality, however, Vietnam and Kampuchea are continuing a fierce "proxy Sino-Soviet war" (National Security Adviser Bzrezinski); and the situation has changed to one in which the Soviet Union, which is backing Vietnam, and China, which is backing Kampuchea, are in fierce conflict in Indochina, from which the United States withdrew.

With this kind of situation, China, while restraining Vietnam with a problem of the overseas Chinese, strengthened its containment of the Soviet Union by making a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan. But the Soviet Union strengthened its support of Vietnam in order to roll back this containment, and, at the same time, has aimed at closer relations with ASEAN.

In June of last year, Vietnam became affiliated with the Soviet-led COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Aid); also, Party Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited the USSR in November, and ostentatiously displayed the unity of the Soviet Union and Vietnam by issuing a joint declaration.

Now the Soviet Union is reinforcing the fighting power of the Soviet Pacific Fleet which is based in its maritime provinces. There must be some purpose to this reinforcement of military power, and it would seem related to the strengthening of its support for Vietnam. But there is a concern that the development of such a state of affairs will influence the security affairs of our own country.

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Soviet Strategy Viewed from Post-war History

If the post-war history of the Asian Pacific Ocean is taken in summary, the Pacific Ocean was under the control of the United States for a long time after the war, although the USSR supported the Chinese revolution and extended the "communist sphere" to the Chinese continent. The United States stationed many military bases in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries; and the security of the western Pacific was maintained by American naval power, as represented in the Seventh Fleet.

The Soviet Union changed this state of affairs and tried to push back even more American power from Asia. The strategy the Soviet Union employed to do this was to set up a rivalry between the United States and China. That strategy was inaugurated at the time of the Korean War in 1950.

The Soviet Union avoided any direct intervention in the Korean War, and wanted China, which had just established its Chinese communist government the year before, to send troops into the Korean peninsula to fight against the American army. Taking this opportunity, both the United States and China entered into a state of bitter antagonism; but this was allowed to happen by none other than the Soviet Union.

Also, the Vietnam war, which began in 1964, aggravated even more the Sino-American antagonism.

In order to get rid of this Sino-American antagonism, the American scheme to turn the tables in its own favor was the Nixon visit to China in 1972 and was the drive for the Nixon Doctrine which followed from the visit.

The United States withdrew 540,000 troops from Vietnam and reduced its military strength elsewhere in Asia as well. However, with the retreat of American military power, a "power vacuum" was created and the Soviet Union stepped in to fill that vacuum.

Likewise, Nixon's visit to China became an opportunity which allowed the communist parties of both China and Vietnam to become antagonistic toward each other. As the Nhan Dan magazine pointed out in August 1972, the Vietnamese communist party has harbored a feeling of mistrust, which is hard to uproot, toward the Chinese communist party which "gave an innertube to a drowning bandit". It was none other than the Soviet Union which gave enormous military aid to Vietnam, which further deepened its mistrust of China, and helped it obtain its victory in 1975.

Having done this, the Soviet Union acquired a "base" of power in Vietnam from which the United States had withdrawn. And Hanoi, which won a victory in the Indochina "liberation war" with Soviet aid, aimed at forming an "Indochinese Federation" with itself as the leader.

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The Soviet Union strongly supported Vietnam in this. Pro-Soviet Party Secretary Le Duan of the Vietnamese Communist Party visited Moscow in October 1975, and issued a joint declaration with the Soviet Union. But, so as not to give any room for Chinese intervention, it hurried with its unification of north and south Vietnam and, at the same time, removed all people of Chinese lineage from positions of responsibility in the party and the military. This became the source of the present "problem of the overseas Chinese".

Taking off on this "problem of the overseas Chinese," China unfolded a campaign of criticism against Vietnam. However, in opposition to this, the Soviet Union intensified its criticism of China, and, on June 29, Secretary Brezhnev made a definite statement that Vietnam is an "advanced base" in which socialism can put its trust.

The Soviet-led COMECON had formally decided on Vietnam's affiliation the day before, June 28. This was an indication that Vietnam, the important place in Southeast Asia, would be committed to the Soviet camp. Undoubtedly, Brezhnev's speech about "advanced base" was the result of these facts.

According to information from the United States Pacific Forces Commander Wiesner, it is said that the Soviet Union has already completely equipped a Soviet missile base in Cam Ranh Bay. It is also said that a Soviet naval base has been built on Cat Ba island, just outside Haiphong Harbor.

In short, the Soviet Union has changed to a situation which literally makes Vietnam, the important spot in Southeast Asia, an "advanced base". This is nothing less than a sound victory for Soviet military and diplomatic strategy.

USSR Strategy Plans for Asia and the Pacific

Thus, the Soviet Union progressively pushed into the Pacific and post-war Asia; and, with the retreat of United States military power, it acquired a base in Vietnam, thereby reinforcing its containment of China.

It seems there are the three following broad aims to this Soviet strategy. These are the elimination of American military power from Asia, the actualization of China-USSR reconciliation, and control of maritime traffic from their Far East bases to the Indian Ocean.

First, the elimination of American military power has shown great progress. The United States military power already has been withdrawn extensively from Indochina; and Thailand, which yielded to Vietnamese pressure, asked for the withdrawal of United States forces stationed in Thailand. The United States army pulled its presence out of Thailand in July 1976. Likewise, American troops are supposed to be withdrawn from South Korea as well. Consequently, the next important aim will be directed at the elimination of American military power in the Philippines.

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Secondly, the actualization of Sino-Soviet reconciliation is expected to be achieved by reinforcing its containment of China. The USSR's greatest desire is that China will yield to Soviet pressure and convert to the Soviet line; and then, Sino-Soviet reconciliation will be complete. With that, it would be possible to divert to Europe the 45 army divisions deployed along the China-USSR border. Therefore, the USSR is reinforcing its containment of China. By doing so, they anticipate that Soviet influence will gain power within China and that China-Soviet reconciliation will come about from the seizing of political power. Their containment of China has been showing progress. Vietnam, together with Laos, is deepening its leaning toward the USSR, especially since Vietnam has become an "advanced base" for the Soviet Union. Therefore, the next aim is directed mainly at ASEAN.

Third, the "control of maritime traffic" has become indispensable for supporting not only USSR strategy toward Asia but its world strategy.

As for control of maritime traffic, they want to have under Soviet control maritime traffic which goes through the Strait of Korea, heads south from the South China Sea, goes through the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. In other words, it is to eliminate American control and establish Soviet control over maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

However, Southeast Asia is a great gateway for this maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. After all, whoever controls Southeast Asia can control maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.


Southeast Asia consists of the three socialist nations and the five liberal nations of ASEAN. The USSR has acquired a base in Indochina. Therefore, the Soviet Union will try next to expand its influence to all of the nations of ASEAN from its base in Vietnam. That will contribute greatly to its attempt to contain China to the south, to cause American military power to pull back from ASEAN, especially from the Philippines, and to establish Soviet control of maritime traffic under the protection of Soviet naval power, which will use Soviet naval and air bases now in Vietnam.

Whoever Controls Oil Controls the World.

In the above manner, the Soviet Union has aimed at control of maritime traffic flowing from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. But, as a Soviet world strategy, that seems to have a close relationship with its strategy that aims at controlling the petroleum shipping routes which go from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to Western Europe and Japan.

The Soviet Union has attached great importance to the Indian Ocean where petroleum shipping routes pass from the Persian Gulf to Europe and to Japan. Since 1963, they have already put their naval power permanently in the Indian Ocean, and given it the duty of "checking" the petroleum shipping routes of the west.

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Key:

1. Treaties of friendship and cooperation
2. USSR
3. Manifesto or declaration of friendship and cooperation
4. cancelled
5. Bangladesh
6. Malaysia
7. Iran
8. Iraq
9. India
10. Turkey
11. Libya
12. Egypt
13. 2.0 million barrels daily
14. petroleum transport routes
15. 4.1 million barrels daily
16. Ethiopia
17. Angola
18. Somalia
19. 18.0 million barrels daily
20. Soviet Union expands circle of friendship and cooperation to all nations. (From 1971. Non-socialist countries are excluded.)
21. Mozambique

After that, the USSR made a military aid pact with South Yemen in 1969, and acquired a naval base in Aden and an air force base on Suqatra Island. On the other hand, South Yemen, which had received aid from the USSR, supported the PFLO liberation movement in Oman, a neighboring country, and threatened the monarchic government of that country. It also tried to threaten the security of the Strait of Hormuz, which is an important gateway for petroleum shipping routes.

Also, in August 1971, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with India, which received enormous Soviet support, crushed Pakistan in the third Indo-Pakistani war and made Bangladesh independent. In March 1972, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Bangladesh also.

Moreover, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq in April 1972, and supported pro-Soviet former Premier Daud with the change of government in Afghanistan, obtaining that country for the Soviet sphere of influence. They made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Somalia in 1974, completely equipping naval and air military bases in that coun-

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try. This became an important base for the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.

In April 1975, the USSR carried out "OKEAN" maneuvers, using the world seas as a stage. Likewise, they carried out naval attack maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, deploying many ships and aircraft. Moreover, the USSR air transported directly to Angola 20,000 Cuban troops for the Angola dispute, which had intensified since the end of 1975. At the same time, Soviet naval units escorted a fleet of ships, transporting to Angola large numbers of tanks and heavy weapons.

The USSR, making a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia in May 1977, sent Cuban troops to Ethiopia just as they did with Angola and their naval power escorted a fleet of vessels to the Eritrean port of Massawa.

Somalia, objecting to the USSR's assistance to Ethiopia, cancelled unilaterally its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in November 1977 and requested the evacuation of all Soviet military advisers and the return of bases being furnished to the Soviet Union. To counteract this, the USSR gave Ethiopia aid exceeding one billion dollars and 50,000 tons. And, they sent 17,000 Cuban troops and 2,000 South Yemen troops to Ethiopia, and unfolded a large scale assault against Somalia. Because of this, the Somalia side, which had brought the Ogaden area under its control, caved into this destruction. Somalia's President Barre suffered the degradation of a defeated commander.

The USSR, which lost the military bases at Berbera and the like because of Somalia's treachery, is trying now to request substitute bases in Eritrea. It is said that Ethiopia has already allowed a Soviet air base in Asmara and a naval base on Dahlak Islands outside Massawa Harbor.

Under these conditions, a siege strategy toward the Persian Gulf has intensified since April of last year. This can be seen in the coups d'etat that have occurred successively around the Persian Gulf areas, such as in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq and others. This also indicates how much importance the USSR attaches to control of the petroleum shipping routes to the western nations from the Persian Gulf.

The USSR is now supplying 80 million kiloliters of oil annually through a pipeline to the Eastern European nations, except Romania. But it seems that the oil production of the Soviet bloc has not progressed enough to meet increased consumption. Therefore, according to some sources, if the oil supply to Eastern European nations should stop in the 80's, it would mean that the Soviet control of Eastern Europe would collapse indisputedly.

From this, it seems that the USSR has been deepening its interest in Persian Gulf oil. But the security of Japan, Western Europe and the United States hangs on the securing of the petroleum shipping routes leading from the Persian Gulf to the western nations. So it can be said that whoever con-

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trols the oil of the Persian Gulf controls the world.

Strategic Value of Indochina.

Thus, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to Indochina from its view of world strategy, especially control of maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. That is because the Soviet Union has discovered the great strategic value of Indochina.

First of all, Indochina, together with the Malaysian archipelago, constitutes the "rim-land" of the southeastern part of the Eurasian continent. However, since Indonesia and the Philippines are in the open seas off of this rim-land, that area becomes an important gateway, tying together the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean.

The shipping routes that go from the Pacific Ocean and pass through this region to the Indian Ocean can be squeezed into the general classification of the following four routes.

The first shipping route is the one that passes through the Strait of Malacca. For the Soviet Union, this route is the shortest route tying the Indian Ocean with the bases in their maritime provinces. In addition, Vietnam, which has become affiliated with COMECON, and Malaysia, which has advocated for Soviet "friendship and cooperation", are close to this shipping route. Therefore, the Soviet Union has the advantage of being able to request bases, as well as port privileges, from Vietnam and Malaysia.

The second shipping route passes through the Strait of Sunda.

The third shipping route is a route that leaves the Indian Ocean, and passes through the Lombok Strait from the Strait of Makassar.

The fourth shipping route is a route that goes through the Indian Ocean, passing through the Strait of Ombai from the Molucca Sea.

These last three shipping routes are a greater distance than the first shipping route, and need a mutual Indochinese agreement as well. Therefore, from the Soviet Union's perspective, it can be said that the first shipping route is much more advantageous, and the possibility of securing it is greater.

Secondly, Indochina has a great value from the perspective of containing China.


The USSR has pressured China from the north, deploying a military force of 45 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. In addition to this, Indochina has joined the Soviet bloc. If the Vietnamese army of 1.5 million men, which is the strongest military power in Asia (if one excludes China), decides to pressure China from the south, the containment of China would be

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solidified even more.

Third, there are great undeveloped underground resources in Indochina.

It is said that there are promising undersea oil fields in the Gulf of Siam and Gulf of Tonkin in Indochina. Further, it is anticipated that there are oil and natural gas deposits in the Red River delta area. Besides this, there are mineral resources of uranium ore, coal, iron ore, zinc and the like in the Phu Lang Thuong area.



Key:
Vietnam's Mineral Resources

1. coal
2. iron ore
3. zinc
4. tin
5. copper
6. gold

It is said that, in exchange for project aid, the USSR aims at the acquisition of these underground resources. Toward this end, it sent to Vietnam a vice-minister level investigation team many times. The investigation team, led by the vice-minister of the Ministry of Geology, prospected for oil and natural gas for about one month last year in July.

According to another report, it was said that the aim which the USSR had in pushing for Vietnam's affiliation with COMECON was the control of its oil and mineral resources.

Fourth, Indochina is an advantageous base to expand its influence to the ASEAN nations.

After the "Indochinese liberation" in 1975, Laos and Kampuchea abolished their monarchies and became socialist countries. Laos deepened its leaning toward Hanoi, but Kampuchea intensified its resistance Soviet-supported Vietnam, requested the

to Hanoi's leadership and, opposing support of China.

Vietnam has aimed at a Southeast Asia under the leadership of Hanoi, and advocated for a "Southeast Asian Common Market" in June 1975. That concept was extensive enough to include the ten nations of Southeast Asia. In short, Soviet-supported Vietnam is trying to extend its influence to the ASEAN nations in place of the Soviet Union. And, Vietnam has become a base for an ASEAN assault by the USSR.

Will Vietnam Become the Cuba of Asia?

On account of the USSR's strategy to make Vietnam an "advanced base", China has been put into a situation where it is threatened from two fronts---the

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north and the south.

China has experienced this kind of military threat three times: the first was when General MacArthur insisted on attacking Manchuria during the Korean War of 1950; the second was when the Soviet army assumed a posture of challenging a full-scale battle by sending tanks to the front. Therefore, this present crisis would be the third crisis for China.

This crisis materialized more last year. Namely, there was an incident in which the Soviet troops invaded the Ussuri River border on May 9. In the south, clashes by both parties---China and Vietnam---have occurred frequently at the China-Vietnam border. The Soviet navy carried out threatening maneuvers between Luzon Island and Taiwan at the end of June. It can be seen that Soviet naval power was "demonstrating" against China, by getting caught up in the China-Vietnam dispute. Further, there was an incident in which the navies of both China and Vietnam battled over Nanshan Island, about which both China and Vietnam are in dispute and which both claim as its own possession.

Under this state of affairs, China, putting up its full strength, has endeavored to organize an "anti-Soviet consolidated front". As is commonly known, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping expressed his "discourse on the big three worlds" at the United Nations natural resources assembly in 1974. That is, one must look for the source of all the evils of the world's wars in the hegemony principles of such large countries as the United States and the Soviet Union, who belong to the first world. But he made it clear for the first time that the existence of Soviet socialist imperialism as the more dangerous.

China has put itself in the third world against this dangerous USSR, and, involving the second world of the leading industrial nations, such as Japan and others, has begun calling for an "anti-Soviet consolidated front". In short, it can be said that China's discourse on the world became the yardstick to measure all acts as either "anti-Soviet" or "pro-Soviet."

Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong made clear his opposition to China in a discourse on the world that divides the world into five worlds at a national assembly just after the 1975 liberation. The first is the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union; and it has the greatest importance. The second is Laos and Kampuchea, which must be added to the "Indochinese Federation"; the third is all of the Southeast Asian nations that form the nucleus of ASEAN. The fourth is the non-aligned nations. And last of all, the United States, Western Europe, Japan and others are mentioned as the fifth. In short, Vietnam's world perspective is a view which puts as its foundation a confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Whether something is "anti-American" or "pro-American" becomes the yardstick for measuring the suitability of all acts.

In other words, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong dealt a frontal counterattack

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against the "discourse on the big three worlds" by Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-ping. So, it is natural that the Soviet Union supports Vietnam.

The USSR allowed Vietnam to become affiliated with COMECON in June of last year. Secretary Brezhnev made it clear that he would support Vietnam resolutely as "brothers" and declared that Vietnam is an "advanced base" which socialism can trust. In short, the Soviet Union made clear its firm intention to add Vietnam to the Soviet bloc.

Under these conditions, China, which aims at forming an "anti-Soviet consolidated front", concluded a China-Japan treaty of peace and friendship on August 12 of last year. The Soviet Union repeatedly objected and warned against this Sino-Japanese treaty, which includes an "anti-hegemony article" hostile to the USSR. This has become a frequent undisguised threat, and is unparalleled as an intervention by a major country in the relations between two other countries.

But the China-Japan treaty was finally concluded, was formally ratified in October and became effective. The China-Japan treaty and the United States-Japan Security Treaty mean that there will be cooperation through the mediation of Japan. The USSR, seeing this as the establishment of an "anti-Soviet alliance" by the United States, Japan and China, is increasing its vigilance. This can be seen from the fact that Party Secretary Brezhnev had a conversation with First Secretary Tsedenbal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the Crimea on August 23. He declared that "recently, very negative elements have arisen in the Far East and Southeast Asia."

The Soviet view is that even though the anti-hegemony article may have been watered down, no basic change has taken place in the anti-Soviet character of the China-Japan treaty. Therefore, the USSR predicted that the status change important for Asia, which comes from the formation of this treaty, namely, the balance of power, will collapse. In order to offset this, the USSR has emphasized repeatedly that there is a need to change Soviet policy toward Asia. It can be stated that the substance of this policy has been able to bring about an important change in the Asian situation, as was pointed out by Vice-chairman Kowarenko of the USSR-Japan Society.

So, the predicted "roll back policy" of the USSR is asking to conclude a USSR-Japan good neighbor friendship treaty in order to restore the balance, and, secondly, is intensifying the military pressure against China. Third, it is to make Vietnam the "Cuba of Asia", and to try to assume the duty of "lead soldier" in its approach to ASEAN.

This kind of movement has already shown itself. Until now, the USSR, along with Vietnam, has not recognized ASEAN as an organization. However, IZVESTIYA recognized ASEAN as an organization for the first time on July 13. Vietnam's newspapers also advocated for a "Southeast Asian Neutrality Concept." Prime Minister Pham Van Dong himself made of tour of the ASEAN countries. As China states, their aim is to try to expand their influence within

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ASEAN as a "Trojan Horse."

Moreover, so as to support Vietnam's move, First Assistant Minister Fillyuvin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, while making a tour of the ASEAN nations near the end of October, made a statement of support for the peaceful character of ASEAN.

After this unified USSR-Vietnam approach to ASEAN, the USSR invited to the Kremlin an administrative-level party delegation, led by Party Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. It can be said without a doubt that their aim was to reinforce Vietnam's "Cuba status."

USSR Has Built a Bridgehead in Indochina.

The USSR entered into its "roll back policy" as predicted. The Soviet Union made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Vietnam on November 3; and with that, the USSR built a "bridgehead" with which to impede China's inroads into the Indochinese peninsula.

The core of this USSR-Vietnam treaty of friendship and cooperation is the article on "emergency deliberations," whereby it was decided to mutually support each other when either party, i.e., the Soviet Union or Vietnam, is exposed to a threat of attack. This article, which makes cooperation important from a military viewpoint, has a high degree of strategic substance.

In June of last year, the Soviet-led COMECON recognized Vietnam's formal affiliation. That indicated that Vietnam has already been included economically in the Soviet bloc. However, to offset that, China made its China-Japan treaty. Moreover, China made clear its plan to cancel the "Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty." The powerful "roll back policy" had begun with the Soviet-Vietnam friendship treaty.


Now, full-scale hostilities by troops of both China and Vietnam, which began in October of last year, have been repeated at the China-Vietnam border. Also, their uncanny move, centering around a "dry season large-scale offensive" has continued into the Vietnam-Kampuchea dispute. Kampuchea's Vice-premier Ieng Sary, who made a speech at the United Nations in October of last year, stated that Vietnam will use again several army divisions, stationed in foreign territories, in its dry season offensive. In this case, Laos is clearly indicated as the foreign territory. It seems that about four army divisions of Vietnamese troops are stationed in Champassak Province on the southern extremity of Laos.

In addition to this, Vietnam includes in the "Kampuchean Liberation Front" Kampucheans residing in southern Vietnam, amounting to about 150,000 men. They have formed a "Kampuchean People's Liberation Army" from among these, and sent out into Kampuchean territory well-chosen guerrillas and political

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saboteurs. They are using this dual front strategy to intensify internal disturbances in Kampuchea. In short, Hanoi is using exactly the same kind of strategy against Kampuchea as they used for the conquest of South Vietnam in the past.



In this way, if Vietnam uses Lao territory for troop movements, it is possible that China will expand its troop movements into Lao territory to counteract them. China built 600 kilometers of road in northern Laos, adjoining Chinese territory. And, it would seem that if they were to use this road, they could easily enter Thailand and at the same time, threaten Vietnam from the rear.

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Chinese Roads in Laos | 17. Ou Dom Sai |
| 2. China | 18. Nam Pak |
| 3. Yunnan Province | 19. Vien Sai |
| 4. Lai Chau | 20. Houei Sai |
| 5. Boun Neua | 21. Sam Neua |
| 6. Hat Sa | 22. Muong Beng |
| 7. Vietnam | 23. Ou River |
| 8. Mengla | 24. Laos |
| 9. Phong Saly | 25. Pak Tha |
| 10. Myo | 26. Muong Son |
| 11. Dien Bien Phu | 27. Pak Beng |
| 12. Burma | 28. Mekong River |
| 13. Ba Ten | 29. Luang Prabang |
| 14. Muong Khoua | 30. Surin Plains |
| 15. Muong La | 31. Thailand |
| 16. Luan Nam Tha | |

Roads built with China's assistance
(600 kilometers completed)
Under construction

With this, there is a danger that the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict will spread to all of Indochina, engulfing Laos. If the USSR backs up Vietnam and China backs up Kampuchea, there is a possibility that it will develop into a Sino-Soviet clash, making Indochina the stage.

The ASEAN nations are exceedingly afraid that it will expand to such a situation. In particular, the feeling of crisis is very acute in Thailand,

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borders Kampuchea. In particular, if Kampuchea cannot withstand a large offensive from the USSR-Vietnam union, and, if a pro-Soviet/pro-Hanoi government appears upon the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, certainly this would be the actualization of an "Indochinese Federation" at which Hanoi aims. Then, the pressure on Thailand would suddenly increase from the USSR and from Hanoi.

Thailand is a country where two coups d'etat have occurred since 1976, caused by the Indochina shock. It is a country which requested a complete evacuation of United States troops stationed in Thailand, because of Vietnam's pressure. In the event that Thailand offers the air bases at U Thapao and elsewhere to the USSR, because of pressure from the Soviet Union which has solidified its "bridgehead" in Indochina, the Soviet Union would be able to control maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca by using its bases in Thailand and Cam Ranh Bay.

However, the appearance of such a situation would not only threaten the South China Sea route for transporting natural resources to our own country, but would have such a great influence that it would destroy the strategic balance in Asia and the Pacific.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

VIETNAMESE PRESSURE FRENCH--Hanoi has been pressuring various French companies, among them ELF-ERAP, to prevent them from signing any big contracts with the PRC. Should they do so, the contracts they have with Vietnam will probably be revised or repudiated. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Jan 79 p 11]

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